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Abstract 
In light of the human genome project, establishing the genetic aetiology of complex 
human diseases has become a research priority within Western medicine.  However, in 
addition to the identification of disease genes, numerous research projects are also being 
undertaken to identify genes contributing to the development of human behavioural 
characteristics, such as cognitive ability and criminal tendency.  The permissibility of this 
research is obviously controversial: will society benefit from this research, or will it adversely 
affect our conceptions of ourselves and each other? 
When assessing the permissibility of this research, it is important to consider the 
nature and deterministic significance of behavioural genetic information.  Whilst to date 
there has been much discussion and debate about the properties of genetic information per 
se and genetic determinism, this has not been applied to behavioural genetic research and 
its ethical implications.  Therefore, this paper elucidates how behavioural genetic 
information can be distinguished from different from other types of genetic and non-genetic 
information and also synthesises the determinative significance of genetic factors for the 
development of human behavioural traits.  Undertaking this analysis enables the ethical 
issues raised by this research to be debated in an appropriate context and indicates that 
separate policy considerations are warranted. 
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Introduction 
Western medicine currently supports research into the molecular genetic aspects of 
many complex human diseases, such as cancer, heart disease and diabetes.  However, 
genetic knowledge is not only being sought for pathogenic conditions - projects are also 
underway to identify genes involved in human behaviours such as cognitive ability and 
criminal tendency.  Contrary to traditional quantitative research in behavioural genetics, 
these molecular genetic projects may lead to information which can be ‘individualized’ to 
particular people.1       
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Potential applications arising from the identification of genes involved with human 
behaviour raise ethical and social issues for individuals and society.  For example, should the 
results of behavioural genetic tests be used when making social policy decisions?  Should 
genetic interventions to alter human behaviour be developed?  What effects might this 
research have upon how people and societies understand themselves and each other?    
In determining ethical applications of this research, it is important that the nature 
and determinative significance of behavioural genetic information is taken into account.  
This paper draws upon existing discourse about the nature of genetic information and 
debates over genetic determinism to place behavioural genetic information in an 
appropriate context.2   
For the purposes of this paper, ‘behavioural genetic information’ is defined as 
molecular genetic information that can be correlated with the development of a particular 
human behaviour.3  This information could be general, such as a set of alleles correlated 
with a particular behaviour being published in a scientific journal; or specific, such as a 
person’s result from a behavioural genetic test.   
It is argued that behavioural genetic information can be viewed as a separate class 
of information, warranting separate policy consideration.  It has a unique array of 
properties, and therefore is significantly different from either ‘medical’ genetic information 
or other ‘non-genetic’ information about behaviour.  However, this property of 
distinctiveness does not mean genetic information should be conceived of as more 
important than other sources of information when considering the causes of people’s 
behaviour.  
 
Behavioural genetic research 
Currently, researchers are working to identify genes influencing the development of 
several human behaviours, including criminal tendency, homosexuality, cognitive ability, 
novelty seeking, mental disorder and addiction.4  These traits are all ‘complex traits’, as the 
pattern of inheritance demonstrated cannot be explained by the involvement of only one or 
two genes.  Any phenotype is the result of a combination of many genes interacting with the 
environment.    
There is no denying that in addition to the social sensitivity of this research, it is 
shrouded in significant scientific controversy.5  The inheritance of behavioural traits has 
been vehemently debated for over a century, with trends oscillating from ideas of 
environmentalism and genetic equalitarianism (people’s behaviour and talents are purely a 
product of their environment) to considerations that our genes set the ultimate limits as to 
what we are able to achieve.  However current dogma accepted by both behavioural 
geneticists and detractors of the research is that people’s genes and the environment they 
are exposed to have an interactive effect on their development.  So, genes can determine 
only the likelihood or probability of a particular behaviour, and do not represent the 
ultimate limits of what we can achieve.6     
A variety of methodologies have been utilised in attempts to demonstrate a genetic 
contribution to human behaviour.  Consider the example of cognitive ability.7  Utilising 
psychometric definitions such as reasoning ability and mental processing speed, research 
papers about the inheritance of this trait have been consistently present throughout the 
history of behavioural genetics.8  Most of these have utilised quantitative techniques, which 
investigate the proportion of differences in intelligence levels between individuals within a 
particular group that can be attributed to genetics.9  The end-point of such studies is an 
entity termed heritability, which represents the genetic contribution to cognitive ability 
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expressed as a percentage of the overall population variation in intelligence.  These studies 
have obtained heritability estimates of around 50%-70%10 - that is, this percentage 
represents the amount of difference between people (in a particular environment at a 
particular time) attributable to genetic causes.  However, there have been large 
inconsistencies between heritability studies11 and they are often criticised.12   
As quantitative genetic studies are not designed to identify specific genes, 
researchers are now using molecular genetic approaches to identify and characterise genes 
contributing to the development of intelligence.13  One such study compared whether 
different alleles (or versions) of particular DNA markers occurred at a higher frequency in 
children of ‘high intelligence’ than those of ‘low intelligence’ (disputes over definitions of 
these states aside).  If a difference was observed in the frequency of a particular DNA marker 
between the two groups (as it initially was), this could indicate the presence of a gene 
influencing intelligence in the region of the marker.  However a subsequent study has failed 
to replicate this finding. 14 
 
Is behavioural genetic information different? 
Although providing meaningful behavioural genetic information to individuals is not 
yet possible, it seems reasonable to suggest that this won’t always be so – and the ethical 
considerations raised earlier will come to the fore.  In considering the implications of this 
research, it is important to consider how distinctive this type of information will be.  First, 
whether or not this information is distinguishable as a class of genetic information could 
influence how legislative or policy responses should be made to the various issues raised by 
the research.  Should there be special policies or laws for behavioural genetics?15  Second, an 
answer to this question might help explain the apparent inconsistency in our attitudes to 
information about ourselves.  Why is it that we are often likely to be interested in (at least 
some of) our medical genetic information and our psychological profiles, but baulk at the 
spectre of knowing about genetic influences on our behaviour? 
According to Murray, if special treatment of genetic information were to be 
warranted, it would ‘have to be distinctive and especially sensitive’.16  He argues that in the 
medical context, genetic information does not meet such a requirement.  What happens 
when this test is applied to genetic information about behaviour?   
It seems obvious that behavioural genetic information will be sensitive – the 
considerable media coverage and public discourse about this research are testimony to this.  
However, to determine whether behavioural genetic information is distinctive, two 
comparisons must be made.  First, we must ask whether behavioural genetic information is 
distinguishable from other non-genetic information about behaviour (an analysis that also 
draws upon the more general question of whether genetic information per se is 
distinctive).17  Second, we need to question whether behavioural genetic information is 
different from medical genetic information.  It is argued here that the answer is ‘yes’, on 
both counts. 
Is behavioural genetic information distinctive when compared to non-genetic information 
about behaviour? 
In a recent commentary, Benjamin argued that: 
In principle there seems to me little difference between information about a 
person’s genes, and how it is treated, and information about his or her intellectual 
abilities, psychological qualities, appearance, and past medical history, and how 
these are treated.18 
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Yet contrary to this view, it is possible to make a distinction between ‘genetic’ and 
‘non-genetic’ information about behaviour.  This can be illustrated by examining some of the 
features of medical genetic information which may render it as distinct, and examining how 
these apply to behavioural genetics.  Common features about genetic information in general 
that have been suggested as reasons to consider it as distinct from non-genetic information 
are that it: 
 Uniquely identifies particular people;19 
 Is ubiquitous: genetic information is potentially all around us; it can be obtained 
from a small amount of material (perhaps even without the person being present) 
and lasts for life; 20 
 Has predictive properties - the results of a genetic test can give people information 
about their future health before symptoms develop;  
 Can be obtained before people are born;  
 May indicate a risk for other genetically related family members or future offspring; 
 May be of relevance to third parties, such as insurers and employers; and 
 Can be shared by members of larger communities beyond the individual or family, as 
is the case with Tay Sachs disease in populations of Ashkenazi Jewish descent.21 
However, there are also many who do not consider medical genetic information to 
be special.  Interestingly, this includes both proponents and detractors of genetic testing and 
research.22  Several claims are made in advocating this position.  First, the ‘predictiveness’ of 
genetic information is not a compelling reason to render genetic information special – many 
other types of information can also provide us with glimpses of our future health, such as 
measurements of cholesterol levels in blood.  Additionally, other factors affecting people’s 
lives (such as social class) are transmissible between generations.  Moreover, medical 
conditions not caused by the presence or absence of a gene are also shared within families, 
as is the case with communicable diseases such as tuberculosis. 
So why is genetic information considered as distinctive by the public and the media, 
and can these claims be substantiated?  Murray has explained the public’s intuition about 
genetic information being distinctive or special as because it carries with it a peculiar 
‘technologization’ or ‘mystery’ that has developed since the introduction of recombinant 
DNA techniques, not because it is actually substantively different from any other kind of 
information.23  However, there remains an intuition that there is something about genetic 
information making it different.   
A better explanation of the intuition behind the belief in so-called ‘genetic 
exceptionalism’ can be made by examining an important quality of medical genetic 
information overlooked to date.  It may be true that none of the above properties of genetic 
information are unique to genetics when each is considered individually.  However, the 
distinctiveness of genetic information – the quality that allows it to be set apart from other 
types of information – is the fact that for most genetic information, all of the above 
properties are present together.  Very few other kinds of health information will possess a 
combination such as this.24  In the very least, it seems clear that the notable features of 
genetic information cannot be ignored, though of course it would also be a mistake to 
consider genetic information in pure isolation from other relevant health and social 
information.25 
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These claims about the distinctiveness of genetic information are also true for 
behavioural genetic information.  Presuming it can be identified and made applicable to 
individuals, behavioural genetic information is capable of being: 
 Uniquely identifying;26   
 Obtainable from a small tissue sample (perhaps before birth); 
 Capable of predicting tendencies towards certain future behaviours; 
 Indicative of behavioural probabilities for other family members or offspring; 
 Of potential interest to third parties such as educators and the State; and 
 Shared by members of larger communities beyond the individual or family. 
It is difficult to think of a personality or psychological test (or any other non-genetic 
information about behaviour) that would possess this combination of properties.   
In addition to these properties, behavioural genetic information is also likely to be 
pleiotropic.  Pleiotropy occurs where a single gene has effects on multiple unrelated 
phenotypes as a gene influencing one biochemical pathway will also be involved with 
others.27  Pleiotropy has already been observed for several complex genetic diseases, such as 
the relationship between coronary heart disease and Alzheimer’s disease, where variant 
alleles of the ApoE4 gene can provide risk information for both conditions.  This may give 
rise to ethical difficulties, as recommendations for testing for one condition (or people’s 
attitudes to one test) may differ significantly depending on the phenotype under 
examination.  How should society respond if genes involved with intelligence were also 
found to be associated with something like anxiety or an antisocial personality?  The moral 
difficulties are likely to be significant.  Although I might be quite interested in genes 
influencing my propensity to undertake novelty-seeking behaviour, I might not want to know 
whether I am at risk of developing alcoholism, were such a link to be found.28    However, 
although the pleiotropic effect of complex genetic information is a ‘special ethical issue’29 it 
may not be one which distinguishes genetic from non-genetic information about behaviour.  
That is, something like the measurement of neurotransmitter levels may also provide 
indications for more than one apparently unrelated human behaviour.30  Yet despite this, 
the properties of behavioural genetic information discussed above still serve to distinguish it 
from non-genetic information.  
Is behavioural genetic information distinct from medical genetic information? 
Although it has been argued that genetic and non-genetic information can be 
distinguished, nothing has been said about whether behavioural genetic and medical genetic 
information can be distinguished from each other.  Given the somewhat fuzzy boundaries 
between considerations of what is commonly considered as ‘health’ and what may be 
described as ‘behavioural’ in Western society, many are likely to argue that such a 
distinction is impossible. 
Despite this potential problem, behavioural genetic information is distinguishable 
from medical genetic information in numerous ways, suggesting a need for at least a degree 
of separate policy recognition.   
Some behavioural genetic researchers have already articulated their view on this 
issue.  For example, McGuffin, Riley and Plomin have argued that: 
Although in many ways behavior presents geneticists with the same challenges as 
other complex psychological and medical traits, behavior is unique in that it is the 
product of our most complicated organ, the brain.31 
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There are other reasons why behavioural and medical genetic information can be 
distinguished.  Contrary to medical genetic information, genetic information about a range 
of behaviours has a much greater potential to affect how individuals perceive their 
personality and attributes, significantly influencing self-perception.  These broad reflections 
on personality and ability may form a much greater component of who we are (our 
‘identity’) than our medical history does.32  Consider again the example of intelligence.  
Bearing in mind the social value placed upon intelligence within Western cultures, it is likely 
that any genetic information about it would be relevant for a vast majority of the 
population, and that this type of information could have a huge effect upon people’s self-
image.   
A third way in which behavioural genetic information can be distinguished from 
medical genetic information is its potential relevance to everyone.  Whilst almost all of us 
will carry some risk for one or two particular genetic conditions in a post-genomic world, the 
difference with behavioural traits is that we are likely to be able to obtain meaningful (a 
greater than zero-risk) profiles for any behavioural trait we choose.  It is hard to think of one 
example of medical genetic information that could potentially affect such a broad range of 
people in such a way – a genetic risk for heart disease will be relevant for many people, as 
will cancer susceptibility information, yet information about behaviours will unequivocally 
affect all of us.   
Fourth, the majority of behavioural genetic information would be of relevance over 
a much broader temporal range of people’s lives.  To be sure, medical genetic information 
for some conditions such as heart disease will be relevant for much of our lives (and 
potentially the lives of our children), to enable us to live a particular lifestyle to minimise 
disease risk.  Yet behavioural genetic information is going to be of much greater relevance to 
our life’s autobiographical narrative; the way we make sense of things over time.  
Particularly as we age, we are more likely to be interested in behavioural genetic 
information than we are medical genetic information.33  If I was 80 and had never had heart 
trouble, there would be no need for me to obtain genetic information about this condition 
to make sense of my health status.  In contrast, our autobiographical narratives are greatly 
informed by our behavioural experiences and tendencies and so this information is more 
likely to attract a special relevance. 
Finally, as mentioned above, behavioural genetic information is much more sensitive 
than medical genetic information, especially when social groups are concerned.  Again this is 
obvious where intelligence is considered, as debate over the relationship between 
intelligence and ethnicity has raged for over a century.  
Thus there are several reasons why behavioural genetic information can be 
distinguished from medical genetic information.  However, a potential objection to this 
distinction arises if we consider the exact boundary between that which is medical and 
which is behavioural.  As most behavioural traits have a ‘continuous’ distribution within the 
population (there are not discrete classifications of behaviour) and some extremes of this 
distribution may have a pathological component, it is often not possible to ‘draw a line’ 
between what is medical and what is not.  Nor is it possible to draw lines between the 
various manifestations or classes of a particular trait within the population.  Mental 
retardation, for example, is usually considered as more a medical condition than a 
behavioural one.  Alcoholism and aggression are more contentiously ‘medical’, as people 
inflicted with these conditions often respond to therapeutic interventions.  So, whether 
behavioural genetic information is distinctive might depend on whether lines can be drawn 
along this continuum between medicine and health, and between various categories of the 
particular behaviour. 
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Buchanan et al note that currently, things the community would be compelled to 
treat are generally considered as medical; this would probably include several behavioural 
extremes.34  Although this concept allows for mere social values (as opposed to more 
objective measures) to define what disease is, prima facie it does make sense.  This reflects 
Jonathan Glover’s point that even though the distinction between night and day is 
problematic, this is not reason for abandoning the distinction altogether.35  The distinction 
between what is medical and what is behavioural may be problematic, but this does not 
mean that such a distinction can never be drawn.   
Therefore, as summarised in the following table, behavioural genetic information is 
different; distinguishable from both non-genetic and medical genetic information.    
  
Table 1: How behavioural genetic information is different 
Compared to non-genetic information  
 Distinct individual tailoring, information 
unique for particular people 
 May be obtained prior to condition 
developing 
 May be obtained about those yet to be 
born 
 A unique combination of properties 
Compared to medical genetic Information 
 Sheer volume of Information 
 Will provide information about a very 
broad range of traits and thus will 
infiltrate people’s lives more 
 Relevant at broader temporal range of 
people’s lives 
 Particularly sensitive information 
 
 
What is the significance of genes influencing human behaviour? 
Although behavioural genetic information may be distinct from both medical genetic 
and non-genetic information about behaviour, this tells us little about how significant genes 
may be to the determination of human behaviour.  This is an important consideration, given 
the widespread concern about this information ever being made available for public 
consumption.36  There is a:  
… dark feeling that biology is destiny, that what was thought to make up human 
dignity, free will, self-determination, is determined by blind molecular and 
physiological mechanisms.37 
Are these fears about the limiting properties of behavioural genetic information 
likely to be realised?  Answering this question necessitates this next phase of analysis – a 
consideration of the way in which behavioural genetic information should be construed as 
an influence on the development of human behaviour.  The validity of this ‘dark feeling’ is 
questioned through an examination of the significance of genetic information from two 
perspectives: those undertaking behavioural genetic research and their critics.  What 
emerges is that researchers do not support such notions of complete genetic determinism, 
but that critics of genetic research still claim an over-emphasis of the significance of genetic 
information.  A more moderate position about the significance of genetic information is then 
advocated, namely that behavioural genetic information can be an acceptable first ‘port of 
call’ in researcher’s quests to understand human behaviour.  However, this information 
certainly should not be the only information sought when seeking to explain human 
behaviour – it will only be valid if represented within a context of other causal factors.   
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Genetic determinism 
‘Genetic Determinism’ is a term broadly used to describe the view that the way we 
look and act is primarily due to the sequences of DNA we possess, with our environment 
playing only a minimally modifying role.38  That is, our traits, diseases and capabilities can be 
solely attributed to the additive effects of genetics and environmental stimuli. This view sits 
in virtual opposition to ‘environmentalism’, supporters of which claim that the various 
environments people are exposed to during their development are a major determinant of 
their behaviour, with genes playing only a secondary role. 
Questions examining how and to what extent genetic information influences human 
behaviour have been debated throughout history – enthusiasm for genetic explanations of 
behaviour first peaked in the nineteenth century, when Francis Galton proposed that 
intelligence was predominantly inherited.39  This research was subsequently linked with 
eugenic acts such as using IQ tests (in English) to limit immigration to North America after 
the First World War,40 and acts of genocide based upon genetic origins during the Second 
World War.  In the 1950s, cultural and environmental explanations of behaviour became 
popular.  Yet with the advent firstly of quantitative, and now molecular techniques (and the 
recent completion of the Human Genome sequencing Project), genetic explanations of 
behaviour have again resurfaced for public consideration.   
What is clear within this current enthusiasm for genetic explanations of behaviour is 
that behavioural geneticists do not support ‘hard’ genetic determinism – they do not believe 
that if one inherits a certain set of genes linked to a particular trait, they will develop that 
trait in almost all environments.  For example, two prominent behavioural geneticists 
recently stated that: 
‘Some of the fears [about the research] derive from misunderstandings about what 
genetics can and cannot do.  The main misunderstanding is to think that genes 
determine outcomes in a hardwired, there’s-nothing-anyone-can-do-about-it way… 
behavioural dimensions (and their extremes and disorders) are complex traits 
influenced by many genes as well as by many environmental factors.’41 
In another commentary, one of the same authors argued: 
There is the assumption that genes are directly determinative such that if you have a 
particular gene, you will inevitably get the disorder with which it is associated… But 
the vast majority of medical conditions are not like that at all. Instead, they are 
multifactorially determined, meaning that they arise from the interplay among a 
mixture of genetic and environmental risk and protective factors… Accordingly, 
genetic effects are probabilistic rather than deterministic in their effects.42 
However, examples of strong support for genetic explanations of behaviour (by 
those not actively involved in the research) can still be found in the literature: 
It is genes that determine the extent to which behaviour may be expressed and the 
environment that creates either limited or full opportunities for expression… it is 
necessary to understand that each of us carries into this world from birth genetically 
ordained behaviours, some of which may be uplifting and life-fulfilling and other 
detrimental to the human condition.’43 
Although researchers and critics alike view the development of behaviour as 
involving both genetic and environmental influences, critics claim that in focussing upon 
genetic factors, behavioural geneticists see these as more important than others.44   
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The genetic determinism debate therefore seems to have closed in one sense only.  
It is clear that hard determinism is unsupported, yet there is no agreement upon how we 
should conceive the importance of genetic factors in influencing human behavioural traits.       
What is the view supporting the significance of genetic information? 
As discussed, no recent papers by behavioural geneticists advocate ‘hard’ genetic 
determinism.  Those undertaking this research do not believe there is a ‘volitional power’ in 
genes, directly compelling a particular behaviour.  Any human behavioural trait will manifest 
via the interaction of a complex of social, biological and psychological factors.   
However, researchers obviously support a role for genes in influencing the 
probability of a particular behavioural trait developing.  They are enthusiastic about genetic 
information – if it were otherwise it is unlikely they would be doing this kind of research.  
Generally, genes are perceived to be a primary causal factor in the development of human 
behavioural traits (a view termed ‘ontogenic primacy’).  Researchers believe that 
behavioural genetic research will be relevant to explanations of particular behaviours and 
abilities that people may have, and that as more behavioural genetic research is carried out, 
more will be understood about human development.   
Further, researchers claim that not only are genes a primary causal factor in the 
development of human behaviour, in future it will also become legitimate to access genetic 
information as a first ‘port of call’ for research, or when seeking to explain or predict a 
particular individual’s behaviour.  This is due to the ‘explanatory primacy’ or ‘informational 
primacy’ of genetic information over any other factors relevant to how a person develops.  
In a recent paper, Plomin and Crabbe declared that in a few years, psychology will be ‘awash 
in specific genes responsible for the widespread influence of genetics on behaviour’.45  
Further, they claim that behavioural genetic information will drastically alter clinical practice 
in psychology and will be valid enough to use in diagnosis. 
Despite this enthusiasm, these statements are flagged with an important caveat.  
Plomin and Crabbe state that in identifying genes associated with behaviour: 
These advances will need to be integrated with corresponding advances in 
understanding the multiple, interactive environmental influences as well… [H]igher 
levels of analysis are increasingly needed to understand the pathways between 
genes and behaviour.46 
These researchers recognise that although finding genes at the molecular level is 
important, the results will be meaningless unless integrated with an understanding of 
processes at neurological and psychological levels.  However, even in the absence of genetic 
determinism, they believe genetic information is capable of predicting the probability of a 
specific human behaviour will become available.  
Other behavioural geneticists have been noticeably absent from debates on genetic 
determinism.  Rather than engage in this kind of discourse, they have preferred to justify 
molecular genetic research by referring back to quantitative experiments indicating a high 
heritability of the trait they are investigating.  Yet, this stance should not be used to promote 
the stereotypical notion of a socially insensitive, ill-informed behavioural geneticist, as very 
few of these actually exist.47 
An inconsistency in the literature arises when we turn to the claims of those critical 
of the significance of genetic information.  Most literature in this area represents genetic 
researchers as holding deterministic views and failing to recognise the importance of other 
complex causal factors in the development of behavioural traits.  Yet, as has been seen here, 
this is not so.48  The views of these critics are now discussed. 
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What do critics of genetic research believe? 
There is a plethora of literature by both scientists not involved in behavioural 
genetic research and philosophers of science, which adopts a strong ‘anti-deterministic 
stance.’49  These critics do not agree that genetic information can have ontogenic or 
informational priority, as they deny that genes have any primacy over other developmental 
influences in behaviour.  They claim that viewing genetic information as significant in these 
ways is an over-simplification of complex developmental processes, in which a phenotype is 
not an end-point but a continually evolving entity.  Instead, they adopt what is termed an 
interactionist view, and state that rather than emphasising either genetic or non-genetic 
information, the interaction between the two should instead be focussed upon.50 
However as most researchers in behavioural genetics now also refer to themselves 
as interactionists, a more structured theory in disagreement with the significance of genetic 
information has emerged.  Termed Developmental Systems theory, proponents of this view 
claim that the effects of genes and environment can never be separated, as they have an 
essential and continuous interdependence.51  Rather, they emphasise causal complexity.  
Individual processes involved in the development of behaviour cannot be isolated, and 
development is significantly influenced by other factors such as spontaneous mutations 
(Table 2).  Central to this view is the concept of parity, the view that the genome should be 
considered as equal with all other factors relevant to development.  Singling out genes for 
separate analysis is therefore misleading, as their influence is inherently linked with all other 
factors that are excluded from genetic studies.   
Thus in contrast to the views of behavioural geneticists, proponents of 
Developmental Systems Theory refute the idea that predictability in behavioural genetics 
will be possible, even if all environments were known.  Further, they argue that DNA 
sequence information has no fixed meaning, but is interpretable only in a particular context.  
Genetic information does influence the development of behaviour, but there are many other 
factors that can promote its development, often in unpredictable ways.   
Proponents of Developmental Systems theory therefore seem to differ with the 
views of researchers in the significance placed upon both ‘ontogenic’ and ‘informational’ 
priority of genetic information in the development of behaviour.  Thus they would claim that 
genetic information cannot be used for clinical diagnosis or prediction of behaviour, as such 
an approach fails to take account of the vast complexity involved.  Can these two views be 
reconciled? 
A more moderate view 
As behavioural genetics is yet to provide us with large numbers of results, how can 
we evaluate these conflicting claims?  The determinative significance of behavioural genetic 
information will have strong repercussions for the permissibility of this research.  At first, it 
seems clear that there is no basis to any claim that ‘biology is destiny’.  However, the 
intricacies of the significance of genetic information, both causally and in its potential use as 
one of the first ‘ports of call’ for explanations of behaviour, require further analysis. 
As Schaffner claims, proponents of Developmental Systems Theory are correct in 
emphasising the roles of numerous causal factors in the development of behaviour.52   Thus 
the ‘ontological priority’ ascribed by researchers may be too great an interpretation of the 
power of genes to direct development.  However, the ‘informational priority’ of genetic 
information may still be acceptable.  Genes could be the first ‘port of call’ for information 
about behaviour, but that this should not be the only type of information worth obtaining 
and analysing.  Genes can have a unique informational role in research upon behaviour, as 
when contrasted with other intracellular and extracellular information, they are easily 
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characterisable, and can be investigated using well-developed research methods.53  Other 
information will be inherently more complex to investigate. 
Thus, when considering the role of genes in behaviour, there is a need to recognize 
the likelihood that there will be a variety of different factors involved, but that genetic 
information may legitimately be sought before any other information, as long as it is 
interpreted within a context of other causal factors.  Kitcher rightly points out that research 
teams cannot investigate every factor relevant to the development of behaviour at once,54 
and just because genes do not act alone in the development of behaviour does not mean 
that they cannot be investigated at all.55  Indeed, if research into behaviour is left merely to 
general terms, what will result is mere ‘explanatory spread’,56 which will not achieve much in 
explaining behaviour.  Additionally, genetic research can actually be carried out at the same 
time as higher-order functional studies, so that the two can then inform each other.57  The 
following table summarises this moderate view: 
 
Table 2: A framework for interpreting behavioural genetic information  
It is important to recognise that: 
 Genes associated with behaviour must be interpreted within the context of other genes 
and the environment (cellular, extracellular and extraorganismic), and that there exists a 
complex web of causes of behaviour.  Genes can be singled out for analysis, but this does 
not mean that they are all that should be considered as relevant. 
 There are factors which complicate DNA expression: 
- Spontaneous Mutations 
- Pleiotropy 
- Variable penetrance – just because a gene is there does not mean that it will be 
expressed within a complex system 
- Variable expressivity – genetic makeup cannot tell us how mild or severe the 
expression of a trait will be. 
 A genetic component to a behavioural trait does not mean that the behaviour cannot be 
altered 
 There will only be rare circumstances where a single gene type is closely tied to a single 
type of behaviour 
 Behavioural phenotypes will not be entirely predictable from genetic information 
 
Therefore, the significance of behavioural genetic information lies in its tangibility to 
researchers and the relative ease with which it can be investigated.  However, this 
explanation does not lend itself to mean that behavioural genetic information is solely 
predictive of how a person’s behaviour, personality or talents will develop.  This will be 
achieved through a vast interactive network of causes at biological, psychological and 
environmental levels.   
 
Where to from here? 
The claims advanced in this paper have been twofold.  First, behavioural genetic 
information is distinct from either medical genetic or other non-technological information.  
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Second, despite this distinctiveness, society should refrain from causally prioritising it over 
other types of information about human behaviour, as it cannot be interpreted without 
additional contexts.     
This analysis is important as it establishes the best context for a reasoned analysis of 
the ethical and social implications of this research.  It has been important to consider what 
behavioural genetic information is and what its significance may be, but the next and 
perhaps even more important step is to decide how it should be used.  Such an analysis is 
beyond the scope of this paper, but an initial question has already been posed above – are 
current public and political responses to the prospect of this information (namely that the 
research should either not be undertaken in the first place; or if it is, that results should not 
be used) rational?   
Without wanting to detract from the purpose of this paper, it can be stated that 
some negative attitudes towards this research may be unfounded.  Behavioural genetic 
research may make a valuable contribution to existing psychological knowledge, and it will 
not shed light on people’s destiny or ultimate limits in life.  Yet it is also important to 
recognise that if people are given access to this information, appropriate mechanisms need 
to be in place to insure that it is not interpreted out of context.  However, these are 
obviously questions that do require future debate, in addition to issues surrounding the 
allocation of resources to behavioural genetics within the current economic climate. 
 
Conclusion 
In response to the challenge of understanding the significance of behavioural 
genetic information to assess the permissibility or otherwise of such research, the central 
questions of this paper have been ‘Is behavioural genetic information different?’ and ‘What 
is its significance?’     
It has been claimed that behavioural genetic information is distinct when compared 
to both medical genetic and ‘non-genetic’ information about behaviour.  However, the 
determinative significance of behavioural genetic information should be interpreted 
contextually as one of many factors considered relevant to the development of human 
behaviour.  Thus behavioural genetic information may be sought in preference to other 
information (due to the relative ease with which it will be able to be procured and analysed) 
so long as this does not lead to other information relevant to explaining human behaviour 
being ignored.  
Obviously questions about the value that this information may have for individuals 
and how this information should be handled socially require further exploration.  However 
at the very least, this discussion has called into question strong objections to behavioural 
genetics based upon fatalistic or semi-fatalistic views.  Although this may appear to be the 
mere defeat of a straw man, arguments against behavioural genetics underpinned by 
fatalism are often advocated, particularly in the media.  It is clear that fears about the 
limiting properties of behavioural genetic information are very unlikely to be realised by the 
research. 
The next but no less significant challenge that researchers and policy-makers will 
face is to facilitate how the sheer complexity of this information can be accurately relayed to 
the public, the media and policy-makers.58   
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